- The SKM Stage 3 Report recommended keeping the Johnsonville Line because no bus Scenario had a better Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR)
- But the SKM Stage 3 Report included tens of millions in costs in the Bus-On-Street that were not required to implement this Scenario
- Including these costs hid that the Bus-On-Street Scenario had the best BCR
This is the 3rd in this series of posts on “How to Fix a Transport Business Case for Rail” and it is recommended that the introduction post, The North Wellington Public Transport Study (2006) and then How to Fix a Transport Business Case for Rail – Part 1 Jack Up the Rail Option BCR are read first to provide context. This post will focus on how the Scenario Benefit Cost Ratios (BCR) were fixed in the SKM Stage 3 Report to help the “Do Minimum” Rail Base Case come first.
The NWPTS Stage 3 Report states that no Scenario managed a BCR of 1.00 meaning that, compared to the Base Case, the Scenario costs were greater than the benefits for every option but the Bus-on-Street Scenario came second:
It is for this reason that the SKM Stage 3 Report recommended the rail Base Case option be implemented as the basis for public transport services to North Wellington City. But the Bus-on-Street Scenario figures were fixed by sinking the Scenario BCR.
Technique C – Invalidly Reduce the Bus Option Benefits
Problem 3 – Base Case doesn’t include General Bus Improvements
A common component of all the scenarios published as part of the Stage 2 public consultation was a proposed suite of “General Bus Improvements” that mainly consisted of improved routes and bus service frequencies with the qualification that:
General improvements to bus services
Under all scenarios existing bus services will be improved as funding becomes available. The following improvements are proposed for all scenarios except the Busway Scenario, which will have a different mix of services.
[NWPTS Scenarios Report, Executive Summary]
and
Additional bus improvements are therefore proposed under all scenarios, except the Busway, to benefit Newlands (Route 56), Woodridge (Route 57), Grenada Village (Route 55), Churton Park (Route 54), Johnsonville West (Route 53), Broadmeadows (Route 46) and Khandallah East and Ngaio (Routes 43, 44 & 45).
These additional bus improvements will cater for new patronage. Before any improvements can be implemented Greater Wellington will need to carry out a full bus route service review to ensure that changes meet the needs of residents and are economically viable.
[NWPTS Scenarios Report, 3.1 General improvements to bus services]
Note the clear statement that the General Bus Improvements would only be implemented following a review “to ensure changes meet the needs of residents and are economically viable”.
The SKM Stage 3 Report also describes the application of ‘General Bus Improvements’ to the Enhanced Rail, bus-on-street, Busway and LRT scenarios with the footnote qualification:
Additional bus improvements are therefore proposed under all scenarios, except the base case or the Busway {footnote 9}, …
{Footnote 9} A full redesign of the operation of bus services in the northern suburbs is proposed as part of the busway scenario and is detailed under the description of that scenario. No general bus improvements are included in the base case.
[SKM Stage 3 Report Section 2.1.2 General Improvements to Bus Services] (bold added for emphasis)
That the General Bus Improvements are not included in the Base Case is noted elsewhere in the Stage 3 SKM Report:
Bus services are assumed to remain the same as they are at present and the general bus improvements included in Section 2.1.2 are not included.
[SKM Stage 3 Report Section 2.1.1 Base Case (BC)] (Bold added for emphasis]
How do the Base Case Bus Services compare to the general Bus Improvements?
The extra cost of the General Bus Improvements can easily be derived from the SKM Analysis spreadsheet and these have a 25-year NPV cost of $26,263,095.
Identifying the benefits of the General Bus Improvements can be derived from the sensitivity test in section I.5 if the SKM Stage 3 Report. This test noted the General Bus Improvements applied to the ‘Base Case’ increased patronage by 2.5%. In a subsequent meeting with the GWRC and SKM, the consultants confirmed the applying Bus Improvements to the ’Base Case’ would lead to Bus OPEX costs to be the same as for the ER1 Scenario.
From the SKM Stage 3 Report Table 5-1 we can determine the total daily commuters (bus and rail) for the ‘Base Case’ to be 3,610 and multiply this by 102.5% gives 3,700. Therefore it can be estimated that the General Bus Improvements increased daily patronage by only about 90 commuters with an estimated PT benefit NPV of $4,722,867.
From the above we can calculate the BCR of the General Bus Improvements is only 0.18 … a very poor performance element of the Scenarios and it is an error to include them in the Scenarios for comparison with a Base Case without them.
The effect of this error on the SKM recommendation
We know the cost of the General Bus Improvements is $26,263,095 while the benefits are just $4,722,867. Removing both the cost and the benefits from all the Scenarios makes a significant difference. Here is the revised BCR Table:
Fixing this possibly error results in the Bus-On-Street Scenario becoming the recommended option … which is a problem for trying to justify retaining the Johnsonville Rail Service.
Technique D – Invalidly Increase the Other Option Costs
Problem 4 – Including Cycleway/Walkway Costs to Bus-On-Street
The Bus-on-Street Scenario (OS1) is title “Bus with Walking and Cycling Scenario” in the NWPTS Scenarios Report that with the Scenario description as follows (bold added for emphasis):
The Bus with Walking and Cycling Scenario will involve replacing the existing rail services with bus services and providing enhanced bus services for the rest of the northern suburbs.
The railway line could be converted to a walking and cycling track or “greenway”, preserving the railway line as a transport corridor and helping to promote active modes of transport and additional recreational amenity.
[NWPTS Scenarios Report Section 4.2] (Bold added for emphasis)
The SKM Stage 3 Report also notes “All scenarios show increases in PT usage that could have a minor positive impact on the amount of walking and cycling”. Neither the SKM Stage 3 Report nor the Stage 3 Costing SS provided by GWRC contain any direct data on increased walking or cycling from the Cycleway / Walkway (or anything else for that matter).
Walkway / Cycleway Capital Costs
However, the $22.3M Capital cost for Bus-On-Street Option included $15.1M to convert the Johnsonville Rail Corridor to a Walkway/Cycleway! If the cost of this Walkway / Cycleway is removed from the Bus-On-Street Scenario, the 25-Year PV Cost is reduced from $25.3M to $6.4M.
Walkway / Cycleway Risk Costs
The Stage 3 Costing SS also has a surprisingly high Risk Cost at $20,599,250.
The SKM Stage 3 Report and NWPTS Risks Report shows the majority of the Bus on Street consentability analysis are actually on issues related to converting the rail corridor into a Cycleway / Walkway including statements such as:
A removal of designation process would need to be undertaken under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and is a relatively straight forward process.
< . . . >
Given the known level of support for rail from some sectors of the community, it would be reasonable to expect that there would be an appeal made against this removal of designation. Because no submissions process is required, it is likely that this would have to go to the High Court for a Judicial Review.
< . . . >
ONTRACK have advised that it believes that, under the Rail Network Bill that was introduced in 2005, the use of the Johnsonville Line for non-rail uses would require the permission of the Minister of Transport. The exact process that would be required is unclear. However, it would be reasonable to assume that this would include a review by the Ministry of Transport and production of Ministerial briefing papers.
Change of ownership issues are also raised by this change in use. WCC would need to acquire the land for use as a walking and cycling track and the New Zealand Railways Corporation may be bound to dispose of the land via a competitive tendering process in which WCC would have to bid. It is likely that WCC would need to approve the adoption of this corridor as GWRC cannot by statute pay for, own or maintain a walking and cycling track.
ONTRACK have advised that it believes that if the corridor was no longer to be used for rail purposes, the land would have to be offered back to the original owners and this could involve claims to the land by local iwi. Should this be the case, there could be a significant delay to the process while settlements were reached and there could be a large financial implication for the scenario.
[SKM Stage 3 Report Section H.2.5 Scenario 2 – Bus on-street Consentability ]
The NWPTS Comparative Risk Report also specifically includes risks with conversion of the Rail Corridor to a Cycling Walking Track. Specifically:
6. Bus-on-Street
6.4. Legislative limitations.
Consequences: 1. Law does not allow for change. Representations would need to be made to seek Crown Approval to use the corridor other than for rail.
Delay Risk: 350 = “Very high threat”
Financial Risk: 280 = “Very high threat”
Reputational Risk: 280 = “Very high threat”
There are a number of other risks which may or may not be associated with conversion of the rail line into a Walking Cycling track such as “6.9. Inability to obtain consents.”
It is ironic that the Government and ONTRACK’s opposition closing the Rail Line should significantly add to the cost of the Bus-on-Street alternative even though the Bus-on-Street Scenario does not even use or need access to the Rail Corridor. It could easily be argued that if ONTRACK refuse to consider closure of the Rail Line, then the costs of removal of the Rail Infrastructure should also be removed from the costs of the Bus-on-Street Scenario (i.e. if ONTRACK want to keep the rail corridor, they can have it !)
The Stage 3 Risk SS provided by the GWRC does not include the calculation of the Risk Cost, but given the statements on the risks associated with the Cycleway / Walkway component of the Bus-on-Street Scenario, it could be assumed that half of the Risk Cost is from the risks of implementing the Cycleway / Walkway (i.e. about $10,299,625).
The effect of this error on the SKM recommendation
While converting the Johnsonville Rail corridor into a Walkway / Cycleway would be a great idea for the community, is not material to comparing the value of a Bus-On-Street Scenario to the Base Case. This is because this huge cost item does not provide any significant transport benefits and so including these items in the OS1 costs is an error.
Removing the Capital Costs and Risk Costs of the Walkway / Cycleway from the Bus-On-Street Scenario has the following effect on the BCR:
Conclusion to Fixing Benefit Cost Ratios Analysis
The analysis in the previous and this post shows the SKM Stage 3 Report had to use multiple techniques to fix the BCR figures to make the Base Case the best option in support of the recommendation to keep the Johnsonville Rail Service. In summary these were:
- Exclude the cost of purchasing new EMUs to free up Ganz-Mavag units for refurbishment from the Base Case and Rail Scenarios
- Exclude any risk cost for implementing the Base Case
- Include the General Bus Improvements to all Scenarios to increase costs without increasing benefits
- Include the build cost and risk cost of a Walkway / Cycleway to increase the costs of the Bus-On-Street Scenario even though this provided no transport benefits.
So finally we can calculate the cumulative effect from correcting all the fixed BCR figures in the SKM BCR analysis:
Because the Bus-On-Street Scenario costs less than the Base Case we end up with a negative BCR which is confusing. We can see what this really means in the following BCR chart:
Correcting any one of the above errors leads to the Bus-On-Street Scenario becoming the preferred option. Once the cumulative effect of all the fixed figures are corrected, the SKM BCR analysis actually shows the Bus-On-Street Scenario had much lower cost and had greater benefits than the recommended Base Case.
Clearly the SKM Stage 3 Report consultants worked overtime to fix the BCR figures in order to hide that the Bus-On-Street Scenario should have been recommended. But it is very puzzling why the Bus-On-Street Scenario should perform so well in the NWPTS future modelling when everyone could see how much the Johnsonville buses were stuck on congested streets. The next post will explore how the SKM Stage 3 Report cooked up this this result by fixing the Transport Model.
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